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Between History and Logic 
Some people think that normative philosophy of science is finished.  That is, the 
project of identifying correct methods for empirical enquiry is simply unfeasible.  On the 
other hand, formal learning theory is a rigorous investigation of the formal constraints on 
empirical enquiry (both self-conscious enquiry by scientists and spontaneous learning by 
children).  In this paper I shall explore the relationship between formal learning theory 
and the fin de méthode view. 
I shall argue that reports of the death of normative philosophy of science are 
exaggerated.  However, what we cannot hope for is a science of science, that is, a wholly 
general and unified account of enquiry as such.  This is partly because our understanding 
of enquiry must draw on a variety of disciplines that have incompatible standards of 
rigour and therefore cannot be unified into a single discipline (here I shall discuss logic 
and history, though we could easily include psychology and sociology).  Partly, it is 
because enquiries are too diverse to constitute the domain of a science. 
First, I shall review the arguments that are supposed to have done for normative 
philosophy of science.  Then I shall briefly examine some familiar arguments (made by 
Wesley Salmon, Larry Laudan and Clark Glymour) about Bayesianism.  These show that 
Bayesianism cannot be the whole story about scientific enquiry.  Finally, I shall examine 
formal learning theory in the light of our prior experience with philosophy of science in 
general and Bayesianism in particular.  I shall argue that much of our accumulated 
wisdom about enquiry makes essential reference to features that vary in structure from 
case to case, and therefore cannot be abstracted into a general account.  The same points 
tell against any general logic of enquiry.  Consequently, normative philosophy of science 
has to be a tradition of methodological wisdom rather than a science of enquiry.  Success, 
for formal learning theory, means finding a place in that tradition. 
This plan requires quite a long run-up before I get to say anything directly about 
formal learning theory.  However, in inter-disciplinary discussions, a review of the 
journey to here taken by one of the disciplines can prevent a lot of talk at cross purposes.  
Since much of what follows will have a rather deflationary tone, let me make clear from 
the outset that in my view formal learning theory is a Good Thing.  Others in this volume 
explain why it is a Good Thing.  My aim is to explore its limits and its relations with 
some of the other Good Things in the philosophy of science larder.  However, this 
voluntary division of labour does not mean that there are no disagreements in this 
volume.  Clark Glymour ends his contribution with the slogan “Epistemology has but two 
aspects: religion and mathematics”.  He argues this claim by reporting that philosophers, 
when they hear about formal learning theory, usually want to set it aside and return to 
‘religious’ (that is, familiar philosophical) questions.1  I do not doubt that his report is 
true—because it sounds like the reaction that philosophers tend to give to any alternative 
to their familiar topics.  They may not want to hear about mathematical epistemology, but 
they are scarcely more ready to hear about the history of science and mathematics, except 
of the most anecdotal 1066 And All That variety.  Epistemology has many aspects—of 
which mathematics is one. 
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 “Is there an external world, are there other minds, is truth relative to belief, what is the best method of 
enquiry, what can we know?” [page ref—last page of Glymour]. 
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1) The End of the Myth of Method 
 Very few philosophers of science now believe that there is a single logical shape 
called ‘the scientific method’ that distinguishes science from other kinds of enquiry and 
accounts for its successes and failures.  The collapse of the myth of method is popularly 
associated with Kuhn and Feyerabend but it is less widely appreciated that what was, in 
their hands, a scandalous heresy has become an orthodoxy.  The basic claim was made in 
a very sober form at the 1974 meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association.  At that 
time the point was still widely contested, so the author had to proceed carefully, “It may 
sound strange, if not heretical to suggest, as I wish to do, that there is no such thing as the 
rationality of science.  At best we can talk about rationalities of science.” (Skolimowski 
1974 p. 191).  Two decades later the cautious tone had given way (in another writer) to 
something close to sarcasm: 
…there was a view of science that commanded widespread popular and 
academic assent...  I shall call it “Legend”…  Champions of Legend 
acknowledge that there have been mistakes and false steps here and there, 
but they saw an overall trend toward the accumulation of truth, or, at the 
very least, of better and better approximations to truth.  Moreover, they 
offered an explanation of both the occasional mistakes and for the 
dominant progressive trend: scientists have achieved so much through the 
use of SCIENTIFIC METHOD (Kitcher 1993 p. 3). 
Kitcher’s sarcasm is directed at the Myth of Method (‘Legend’), not at science itself.  His 
book is subtitled ‘Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusions’, and aims to 
show how we can understand progress in science without having to subscribe to this 
‘Legend’. 2  Examples of similarly dismissive attitudes to ‘Legend’ could be multiplied 
without difficulty, not least because the story of the fall of the myth of method has 
become standard material for writers of undergraduate textbooks.3 
 How did this shift happen, and why did it happen just then, in the second half of 
the twentieth century, twenty-three centuries after Posterior Analytics and three and a 
half centuries after Bacon and Descartes?  The crucial development seems to be the 
coming to maturity of the historiography of science.  This is a twentieth-century 
development.4  There were historians of science in earlier centuries, but they were 
isolated and did not constitute a discipline.  Perhaps as a consequence, their work tended 
to be synoptic and lacked consistent attention to detail.  Moreover, such histories were 
rarely philosophically disengaged.  Think, for example, of Whewell’s History of the 
Inductive Sciences (1857).  It is certainly philosophically-motivated (a decade earlier 
Whewell wrote The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Founded Upon Their History).  
Since his history covered the entire history of empirical science in two volumes it could 
not hope to pay close attention to the fine detail of every episode.  Only in the last 
                                                 
2
 The motto of Kitcher’s book is Shakespeare’s Sonnet 130 ‘My mistress’ eyes are nothing like the sun’. 
3
 For example John Losee’s Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (1993) ends in a debate 
over the very possibility of normative philosophy of science.  Larry Laudan’s 1987 article reverses the 
rhetoric of Skolimowski’s 1974 piece; in arguing that philosophers should continue to seek the scientific 
method, Laudan consciously sets himself against the grain of current opinion.  It should be noted that 
‘philosophy of science’ here means philosophy of science written in English.  The French, for example, 
have never really forgotten the lessons taught by Duhem and Bachelard. 
4
 See Kuhn (1986) for an indication of the rate of growth of research in the history of science. 
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century have we seen the establishment of degree programmes, peer-reviewed journals 
and the rest of the institutional apparatus that allows pioneering and programmatic work 
to give way to normal research.  Only under these circumstances is it likely that scholars 
will devote themselves to the intense study of narrow domains.  And when present-day 
historians write synoptic histories, they can root their accounts in the monographs and 
articles of specialists on this science in that period.  No such specialist literature existed 
in Whewell’s day. 
 How did the development of the history of science as a mature discipline tell 
against the Legend of Method?  This is a large question since neither the history nor the 
philosophy of science is a monolith, so the story of their encounter cannot be simple.  As 
the case of Whewell shows, they were tangled up together before the history of science 
emerged as an independent discipline (and indeed before normative methodology became 
a specialism).  Among the philosophers, there was little understanding that history is a 
separate discipline with its own characteristic standards of rigour.  The most naïve 
philosophers hoped that a simple appeal to the facts of history would bear out their 
models of the logic of science.  Others were more sophisticated—Lakatos, for example, 
drew on his earlier life as a Marxist to argue that every historical narrative presupposes 
an ideology (or in the case of the history of science, a methodology), so the competition 
between methodologies becomes a competition between their respective associated 
historical narratives.5  On the whole, though, most English-speaking philosophers of 
science had little to say about the philosophy of history.  Those who engaged with the 
philosophy of history at all usually assumed that historical explanations are like 
explanations in natural science or, if they are not, they ought to be.6  Others seemed to 
believe that historians do no more than set facts in chronological order, ready for 
philosophers to use.7  This naivety about the nature of historiography may explain the 
optimistic hope that the history of science could serve as an objective test-bed for 
philosophical theory.  If an account of method fails to capture the practice of the greatest 
scientists in history (went the thought), then it cannot be correct.  After all, the great 
scientists must have been doing it right—the philosophers’ job is to work out the logic of 
what they were doing.  Thus, history was to supply philosophy with an objectivity that it 
is usually supposed to lack.  History would teach philosophy by examples. 
For most English-speaking philosophers of science, this ‘historical turn’ became 
problematic in the shape of Thomas Kuhn.8 
Kuhn claimed that there is something in the very activity of history-writing that is 
incompatible with the traditional quest of normative philosophy of science for general 
methodological precepts.  His account of historical method is rather sketchy, and the 
majority of his critics in philosophy of science had little interest in the philosophy of 
history.  It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Kuhn’s attempt to argue the incompatibility 
                                                 
5
 ‘History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions’ (in Lakatos 1978 vol. 1) 
6
 See for e.g. Hempel (1963).  Of course, Hempel did not thoughtlessly assume that historical explanations 
must appeal to ‘covering laws’.  Rather, he formed a view about explanation in general that drew its most 
compelling examples from natural science, and then insisted that historical explanations must be of this 
same sort.  In doing so (I think) he articulated and defended the tacit assumption of most English-speaking 
philosophers of science at the time. 
7
 E.g. Laudan (1987). 
8
 I argue for my reading of Kuhn in Larvor (2003).  
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of rigorous history and normative methodology generated more heat than light.  
Nevertheless, from Kuhn and his sources I extract the following.   
First, historians treat events, including scientific developments, in their own terms 
rather than as preparations for the present.  Further, they understand as good humanists9 
that a word or deed means what it means in virtue of what is said and done around and 
about a given occasion of speech or action.  This entails that we cannot extract antique 
theories from their contexts for the purpose of comparison with later theories, because 
when so extracted they cease to be themselves.  We cannot, for example, compare what 
Aristotle had to say about bodies under gravity with what Newton thought because 
Aristotelian bodies, strictly speaking, do not encounter gravity.  It does not follow that 
meaningful comparisons cannot be made, but they require such a labour of translation 
and explication that we do not get from them regimented data suitable for testing 
philosophical theses.  All we get is a plausible account of the journey from there to here.  
So we cannot, for example, do a statistical survey of past science to see what logical 
approaches have worked best.10  To do so, we would have to decontextualise episodes in 
the history of science to such a degree that they would become unrecognisable to the 
historians who know them best.  Such surveys of ‘the historical record’ are not on 
because the historical record is not and cannot be a body of regular, standardised data like 
Wisden. 
Second, making sense of the science of the past often consists in setting it in its 
proper time and place.  In other words, historians of science typically deny internalism 
(the view that the growth and trajectory of science can be explained without reference to 
anything except the encounter between argument and evidence).  For example, in the 
most recent edition of Isis11 the leading article is “Wonderful Secrets of Nature: Natural 
Knowledge and Religious Piety in Reformation Germany” by Kathleen Crowther-Heyck.  
Internalist philosophers of science would insist that the effects of religious piety on 
German science must have been short-lived, inessential and probably regrettable.  
Historians would consider it unrigorous to approach the question with such prejudices in 
hand (perhaps religious piety played an essential, long-lasting and laudable role).  To take 
another leading history of science journal, History of Science, the March 2003 edition 
contained the following major articles: “‘Purifying’ Science: E. C. Slater and Postwar 
Biochemistry in the Netherlands” (Ton van Helvoort); “Herbert Spencer and the Disunity 
of the Social Organism” (James Elwick); and “‘Men of Science’: Language, Identity and 
Professionalization in the Mid-Victorian Scientific Community” (Ruth Barton).  The 
rejection of internalism is less obvious from these titles (though the scare quotes around 
                                                 
9
 That is to say, academics with the mental habits characteristic of the traditional ‘humane’ disciplines of 
history, literature and philosophy.  Good humanists in this sense need not be humanitarians, nor need they 
be atheists. 
10
 I have in mind Laudan’s suggestion in his (1987).  He proposes treating methodological precepts as 
hypothetical imperatives, so that the differing cognitive goals of present-day and historical scientists are 
taken into account. 
11
 June 2003.  George Sarton founded Isis, an international journal dedicated to the history of science, in 
Belgium in 1912. After World War I, Sarton and the journal moved to the United States. Today, Isis is 
edited by Margaret Rossiter at Cornell University, and published and distributed quarterly by the University 
of Chicago Press. 
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‘purifying’ and ‘men of science’ are significant12).  Nevertheless, it is clear that van 
Helvoort, Elwick and Barton are not simply recording successive encounters between 
hypotheses and data.  These examples were chosen arbitrarily (simply by taking the most 
recent editions at the time of writing) and could easily be multiplied. 
 Third, historians are wont to historicise everything, including the logical 
categories that philosophers need in order to do normative methodology.  Here is Kuhn 
on distinctions such as that between the contexts of discovery and justification13: 
For many years I took them to be about the nature of knowledge, and I still 
suppose that, appropriately recast, they have something important to tell us.  Yet 
my attempts to apply [these distinctions] even grosso modo, to the actual 
situations in which knowledge is gained, accepted, and assimilated have made 
them seem extraordinarily problematic.  Rather than being elementary logical or 
methodological distinctions, which would then be prior to the analysis of 
scientific knowledge, they now seem to be integral parts of a traditional set of 
substantive answers to the very questions upon which they have been 
deployed.14 
Any historian worthy of the name will want to know how the tradition that Kuhn 
mentions (“a traditional set of substantive answers”) arose and developed, in response to 
what and against what opposition.  In this historicist light, the apparently innocent 
distinctions employed by philosophers suddenly seem question-begging.  Kuhn’s 
importance, in my view, is to have articulated (however obscurely) the stance of 
professional historians towards the objects of their studies. 
 Historicism may be natural to historians but it is alien to most philosophers of 
science, and, more importantly, inimical to their philosophical projects.  Some 
philosophers embraced historicism: history (they insist) teaches that everything is relative 
to its moment, to its place in the great flux.  The search for timeless abstractions called 
‘correct methods of enquiry’ is therefore pointless or perhaps even impossible.  However, 
this historicist, relativist, quietist line fails to acknowledge that questions about scientific 
procedure and propriety are not mere philosophical cobwebs.  Sometimes, scientists (and 
science funding bodies) have decisions to make that involve normative methodological 
judgments.  We cannot be content to say “Do the done thing for your time and place”, 
because current practice may be mistaken or undetermined.  It is precisely in cases of 
underdetermination or doubt that normative issues become pressing.  Then there are those 
occasions when scientific controversy achieves a wider public significance, such as the 
struggles over creationism, food safety and global warming.  In such disputes, each side 
inevitably accuses the other of being unscientific and these accusations are not always 
empty or philosophically naïve.  What is more, philosophers have accumulated a rich 
store of methodological ideas plus some impressive formal theories (such as formal logic, 
probability and the formal learning theory discussed in this volume).  It is trite to dismiss 
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 ‘Men of science’ is the nineteenth-century transitional phrase between ‘natural philosopher’ and 
‘scientist’. 
13
 In the ‘context of discovery’ hypotheses are invented; in the ‘context of justification’ they are evaluated.  
In the Twentieth Century it was widely held (by Popper and most of the Vienna Circle, for example) that 
there is no logic of hypothesis-invention but there is a logic of hypothesis-evaluation. 
14
 Kuhn 1970 p. 9. 
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all this with a single historicist gesture.  The Legend of the One True Method may have 
been discredited, but the original question remains: how should we enquire? 
The history of science, then, is not the friendly source of methodological morality 
tales for which normative methodologists once hoped.  On the contrary, historians deride 
such tales as ‘whiggism’.  If methodologists are to address the enduring questions about the 
nature of enquiry, they must first disengage themselves from the history of science, at least 
as it is written up by professional historians.  This is relatively easy to do.  Notice first that 
the historicist dictum—that historical phenomena owe their identities to their places in the 
great flux, and must therefore not be abstracted for fear of distortion—is not a conclusion of 
historical enquiry.  It is, rather, a methodological precept.  Since philosophers do not share 
the aims of historians, they need not share all of the historians’ premises and methods.  
Historians usually want to know why this scientist at this time and place wrote, spoke and 
acted as he did.  Philosophers have no professional interest in such specifics—their 
interest is in the argument as such (if such a thing can be identified).  In any case, the 
history of science may not be as relevant as philosophers once thought.  Larry Laudan 
argues that methodological precepts should be read as hypothetical (rather than 
categorical) imperatives: ‘If you have cognitive goals {A, B, C}, then use method {a, b, 
c, d...}’.  Most of the great scientists of history had different cognitive goals to scientists 
of the present day (Newton and Boyle, for example, saw the construction of a natural 
theology as a central task of science15).  Consequently, the successes and failures of their 
methods are irrelevant to us.  This allows Laudan to square our intuition that the great 
scientists of the past were instrumentally rational (that is, they effectively matched means 
to ends) with Feyerabend’s observation that they rarely acted in conformity with 
methodological precepts that seem compelling to us.  In any case, there is no a priori 
reason to suppose that the best methods of enquiry lie in the recorded past at all.  Perhaps 
they have not yet been discovered. 
 Disengagement from the history of science returns methodologists to the problem 
that reference to the historical record was supposed to solve.  How are methodological 
questions to be resolved?  Philosophical argument rarely resolves anything, and 
philosophical intuitions are hardly objective.  The history of science was supposed to 
provide an objective test-bed for philosophical theories.  If the history of science is not 
suitable for this purpose, then where is normative methodology to find its objectivity?  
Studies of present-day scientific practice are unsuitable for many of the same reasons that 
prevent history from grounding philosophical arguments.  One attractive option is to 
abandon the search for empirical-historical tests of methodological theory altogether, in 
favour of an a priori account.  Philosophers cannot, nowadays, pretend to offer substantive a 
priori knowledge.  But mathematicians can.  We come at last (by a lengthy but, I hope, 
dialectically satisfying route) to the present popularity of formal accounts of enquiry. 
2) The Formal Turn: Bayesianism 
 Insofar as normative methodology is turning to mathematical models of enquiry, 
it is returning to where it was before its dalliance with history.  English-speaking 
philosophers of science used to look to formal logic and mathematical accounts of 
                                                 
15
 These examples, and the argument here reported, are taken from Laudan (1987). 
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induction in their attempts to specify the ‘logic of science’.16  Then, from Kuhn and 
others, we learned to suspect such models.  These logics seemed so abstract as to have 
lost sight of actual scientific practice altogether, and depended for their intelligibility on a 
set of arbitrary and question-begging distinctions.  Now, having learned that it is hard to 
sleep with historians without catching their historicist fleas, many philosophers of science 
seem ready to turn back to mathematics.  Dialectical journeys often lead back to a more 
sophisticated and acutely self-aware version of the starting-point.  The trick, of course, is 
not to forget what was learned en route. 
 The most popular mathematical model of enquiry at the time of writing seems to 
be Bayesianism.17  It is worth taking a glance at Bayesianism, since its difficulties are 
typical of those suffered by formal accounts of enquiry.  Moreover, the sort of argument 
that I wish to make with respect to formal learning theory has already been made in the 
case of Bayesianism by Wesley Salmon, Larry Laudan and Clark Glymour, among 
others.18 
 In order to use Bayes’ theorem one must have identified a small (or at any rate, a 
finite) number of ‘serious’ or ‘plausible’ hypotheses.  One must already know what 
counts as a plausible explanation, what counts as relevant evidence and what counts as 
background belief.  These judgments of relevance and plausibility are only possible if one 
already knows (or at least, believes that one knows) a great deal about the domain under 
investigation.  In case anyone should suppose that relevance and plausibility can be 
decided by pre-scientific common sense, recall that only a few centuries ago, serious, 
intelligent people thought that the number of planets is related to the number of holes in 
the human head.  In other words, the infinity of possible worldviews and underlying 
metaphysical schemes must somehow be cut down to a manageable handful before the 
Bayesian story can start.  Therefore, Bayesianism cannot supply a complete account of 
scientific enquiry.19  Salmon suggests that the Bayesian algorithm be supplemented with 
a Kuhnian account of how relevance and plausibility are fixed.  Indeed, Salmon hoped for 
a synthesis between the historical and logical sides of philosophy of science.  In the end, 
though, the Kuhnian supplement comes to dominate the Bayesian element in his account:  
“The [Bayesian] algorithms are trivial; what is important is the scientific judgment 
involved in assessing the probabilities that are fed into the equations.”20 
                                                 
16
 And in the case of the Vienna Circle, German-speaking philosophers too. 
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 Bayes’ theorem allows us to evaluate the conditional probability P(T/E.B) that a given hypothesis (T) is 
true provided both our background beliefs (B) and some new piece of evidence (E) are true: 
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To use (even this simple version of) the theorem, we must know i) the conditional probability of the 
hypothesis being true given only the background beliefs; ii) the conditional probability of the evidence (E) 
given that both the background beliefs (B) and the hypothesis (T) are true; and iii) the conditional 
probability of the evidence (E) given that the background beliefs (B) are true. 
18
 Glymour (1981); Laudan (2000); Salmon (1990). 
19
 Bayesians know this.  Most Bayesians regard Bayesianism as no more a set of rational norms on belief 
formation and modification. 
20
 Papineau (ed) 1990 p. 287. 
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 Laudan’s argument21 focuses on just one methodological thought: a good theory 
ought to address all the phenomena in its field.  Other things being equal, it is a 
shortcoming in a theory T to say nothing about some phenomenon p in its domain of 
enquiry.  In Bayesian terms, T says nothing about p if the conditional probability of p 
given T equals the prior probability of p.  In this case, the likelihood of T in the face of p 
is exactly the same as its probability prior to p.  That is to say, a true Bayesian’s 
confidence in T will be unaffected by T’s failure to address p, even though p is among the 
phenomena that a good theory in this domain ought to address.  A Bayesian might reply 
that T could still be true—but we do not want scientific theories that are merely true, we 
want ones with deep explanatory power.  Of course, T may offer such significant 
explanatory benefits on some other front that it effectively re-defines the domain so that p 
falls outside it.  Then T’s failure to address p ceases to be an issue.  This, though, is not a 
judgment that Bayesianism can formalise.  What loss of scope is a price worth paying for 
a gain in explanatory power?  Like Salmon’s judgments of relevance and plausibility, this 
part of scientific thinking falls outside of the Bayesian account.  It remains to be seen 
whether any formal account can model such judgments.22 
Clark Glymour offers a generalised version of Laudan’s argument.  Glymour 
maintains that: 
There are a variety of methodological notions that an account of confirmation 
ought to explicate and methodological truisms involving these notions that a 
confirmation theory ought to explain: for example, variety of evidence and 
why we desire it, ad hoc  hypotheses and why we eschew them, what 
separates a hypothesis integral to a theory from one ‘tacked on’ to the theory, 
simplicity and why it is so often admired, why ‘de-Occamized’ theories are 
so often disdained, what determines when a piece of evidence is relevant to a 
hypothesis…23 
Glymour goes on to explain that, in his view, Bayesianism can explicate some but not all 
of the items in this list, and that “There are elementary but perfectly common features of 
the relation between theory and evidence that the Bayesian scheme cannot capture at all 
without serious—and perhaps not very plausible—revision.”24  He goes on to explain that 
he considers Bayesianism pertinent for statistical reasoning and that it captures some 
principles of ordinary reasoning.  I report his view here but not his arguments for it, since 
these would put off consideration of formal learning theory even further. 
My point is that contemplation of actual scientific practice, for all it led 
philosophers to an unwelcome brush with historicism, did leave us with a fund of 
methodological wisdom.  Not the One True Method, but a collection of methodological 
‘notions and truisms’, together with a respect for the sensitivity to the particular situation 
that is required to use them well.  Bayesianism cannot be a comprehensive account of 
scientific reason unless it can model and account for all these notions and truisms.  This 
point tells only against those who imagine that Bayesianism is the whole story—no-one 
denies that it has something important to say.  Most Bayesians regard Bayesianism as a 
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 Laudan 2000 p. 173. 
22
 In this volume, Clark Glymour argues that formal learning theory can articulate some of these trade-offs, 
even if it cannot calculate them. 
23
 Glymour in Papineau (ed) 1990 p. 293. 
24
 Glymour in Papineau (ed) 1990 p. 294. 
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set of constraints on the relative strengths with which we hold our beliefs, but insist that 
how those beliefs are formed and evaluated within these constraints is another question.  
Bayesianism cannot by itself explain scientific successes (though it may explain those 
failures in which its formal constraints are violated) nor can it offer advice about the 
choice of concepts, tools, background metaphysics, problems to address and experiments 
to attempt. 
3) Formal Learning Theory 
 The simple claim that I have just made with respect to Bayesianism seems to 
come for free in the case of formal learning theory.  For, learning theory asks under what 
conditions a problem is solvable ‘in the limit’, that is, does the sequence of conjectures 
produced by a given scientist-function stabilise in the long run?  This question matters to 
us even though ‘in the long run we’re all dead’, because “if you can’t know the truth in 
the long run, you can’t know it in the short run either.”25  So learning theory offers us 
constraints of the form: learners with these computational bounds will never solve 
problems of that logical type.  It might seem that we could stop here with the conclusion 
that learning theory provides theorems about what is possible in the limit that leave a lot 
of latitude for the exercise of informal expertise (like Salmon’s attempt to yoke Bayes 
and Kuhn together).  However, this will not do, first because learning theory does not 
entirely respect the short-run/long-run distinction, in the sense that it considers questions 
of efficiency (which scientist-functions stabilise quickest?).   Second, learning theory is 
able to formalise some of our common stock of methodological notions and maxims 
(such as consistency, conservativeness and decisiveness, for example) in order to assess 
their effects in the limit.  An obvious question arises: can it formalise all of them?  If not, 
what part of our accumulated methodological wisdom escapes formalisation, and why? 
 To make the question more pointed, consider this programmatic passage from 
Martin & Osherson’s Elements of Scientific Inquiry: 
Whatever the motives for studying inquiry, we must begin by appreciating the 
complexity of the subject matter.  As a form of human behavior, science 
involves a wide range of activities, both in and out of laboratories.  Surely 
such a phenomenon cannot be understood without substantial idealization.  
By limiting attention to just a few, salient aspects of science we may hope to 
understand their interaction within the larger scheme, and eventually 
illuminate further variables that can be added to our model at a later stage.26 
We are given no reason to suppose that enquiry (considered as a complex) has a logically 
modular structure that would allow us to isolate and model some of its ‘elements’ without 
reference to the whole activity—notice that this atomism is incompatible with the holism 
proper to historical studies.  Nor is it obvious that anything recognisable as human 
enquiry remains after the ‘substantial idealization’ required for formalisation.  Indeed, it 
may be that a mathematically precise model of enquiry falsifies the phenomenon.  Some 
case-studies seem to show that ambiguity is necessary for progress.27 
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 Glymour 1996 p. 282. 
26
 Martin & Osherson Elements of Scientific Inquiry (1998) p. 1.  Notice that this title suggests more than a 
study of formal constraints on inquiry. 
27
 I have in mind Lakatos (1976), in which the elasticity of concepts is essential to the growth of 
mathematical knowledge.  Also, see Grosholz (2000), who argues that mathematical knowledge sometimes 
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 To return to our question, let us see if there are any methodological notions and 
precepts that cannot be included in a sequence of progressively more complex formal 
models as envisaged by Martin & Osherson. 
The first thing that leaps out of the literature on formal learning theory is the 
notion of a ‘paradigm’.  This term is clearly owed to yet distinct from the concept 
introduced by Kuhn.28  One reason to adopt this Kuhnian terminology is this: learning 
theory has from its inception tacitly accepted the Kuhnian view that enquiry can only get 
going when there is a consensus on all the hard metaphysical and methodological 
questions.  In Gold (1967), published only five years after The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, the class of possible languages is specified in advance.  In later expositions, 
enquiry is modelled as a game played between Nature and a scientist.  The players are 
given a set of possible realities.  Nature chooses one of these possibilities as the actuality, 
and the scientist has to identify this from the data-stream, or ‘environment’ supplied by 
Nature.  Technically, a ‘paradigm’ formal learning theory in has five elements: the set of 
potential realities; a problem; for each possible world a set of data-streams or 
‘environments’; some scientist-functions; and a criterion of success.29  All this has to be 
fixed in advance, as in Kuhnian normal science (and Bayesianism: recall the seven 
stars/seven apertures).  There is an important difference, in that in Kuhnian normal 
science the paradigm is socially agreed rather than explicitly stated.  Moreover, the social 
agreement is not a set of rules but rather a collection of paradigmatic examples; and the 
question of the similarity of new cases to these examples is forever open-ended.  
Nevertheless, the Kuhnian view that scientists have to fix their methods and metaphysics 
before they can do any science is unusual among formal accounts of enquiry. 
However, learning theory says nothing about the central Kuhnian question: how 
do we get from a failing paradigm to a more promising one?  Of course, philosophy of 
science does not have an agreed, established answer to this question.  It does, however, 
have some methodological notions and truisms.  One we have already had from Laudan 
is that a theory (or paradigm or research programme or tradition of enquiry—the exact 
unit of analysis is not important) is in trouble if it cannot explain phenomena that clearly 
lie within its domain.30  Such problematic phenomena need not contradict the theory; they 
need only embarrass it by showing that its scope is insufficiently broad.  This, as we 
noted in the case of Bayesianism, raises the whole problem of the unity and limits of a 
domain of enquiry.  How do we establish the domain-boundaries that allow us to say that 
a theory fails to address some of its proper objects?  For to do so, we must have some 
way of identifying the domain that is independent of the theory in hand.   
This question is especially knotty because domain-boundaries can shift under the 
influence of a dramatically successful new theory.  For example, Galileo at once 
narrowed an Aristotelian domain, as he separated the science of motion from the general 
                                                                                                                                                 
grows by hybridisation, and that these hybrids “often admit an instability or inconsistency that is however 
held in place or made tractable by the rational relatedness provided by the abstract structure that holds the 
domains together” (p. 88).  Her case study suggests that instability or inconsistency may be more than 
regrettable flaws; they may be essential for progress. 
28
 I am tempted to label this new sense of ‘paradigm’ thus: paradigm23, in honour of the twenty-two senses 
of the term that Margaret Masterman discerned in Kuhn (1970). 
29
 Martin & Osherson (1998) pp. 2–3. 
30
 Laudan calls these ‘non-refuting anomalies’ (2000 p. 166); Lakatos calls them ‘heuristic falsifiers (1976 
p. 82). 
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problem of change; but at the same time he unified the physics of the Earth and the 
Heavens.  Nevertheless, insofar a domain of enquiry is a natural unit, it is so in virtue of 
commonalities and connections in its subject matter.  There is a science of physics in 
virtue of commonalities among physical processes.  There is a science of primatology in 
virtue of commonalities among primates.  It seems to me unlikely that we will ever have 
a general logical account of the unity of domains because the commonalities that unify a 
domain are inevitably specific to that domain.  The commonalities that unite primates 
into a domain of enquiry seem to be of a quite different sort from the commonalities 
among physical processes that render a science of physics possible.  If I am right about 
this, then no formal theory of enquiry can ever fully articulate those methodological 
notions and truisms that refer to the borders between domains of enquiry.  Those borders 
are established and maintained by means and criteria that are local to those domains, and 
will therefore resist formal modelling.  Indeed, for the same reason, no general account 
(formal or otherwise) can go far beyond the truism that, other things being equal, a theory 
should address all those phenomena in its domain.  The case of Galileo shows why: 
sometimes, progress requires that domain boundaries be redrawn. 
Next, there is the obvious passivity of the ‘scientists’ (that is, scientist-functions) 
in learning theory.  They do not need to carry out experiments, because the data is 
supplied to them by the ‘environment’.  In formal learning theory, the ‘environment’ is 
nothing but a stream of data.  This is a more significant idealisation than may at first 
appear.  An experiment is a complex of physical processes (bombarding this with a 
stream of those, mixing some of that with a tincture of the other, etc.).  It takes 
considerable scene-setting to turn such manipulations of matter into arguments.  Doing or 
seeing something does not, by itself, generate propositions.  It is at this point that familiar 
considerations about the theory-laden-ness of data enter the story.  The conduct and 
interpretation of experiments normally requires expert judgment, tacit knowledge and a 
trained eye (and if the experiment is to be robust it must be repeated in a variety of 
different laboratories, requiring a whole community of trained eyes).31  All our 
accumulated sensitivity to the logical and phenomenological subtlety and fallibility of 
experimentation is abstracted away in formal learning theory.  Instead, we have an 
optimistic sort of empiricism in which the ‘environment’ supplies indubitable facts, ready 
to use, to a passive observer.  This is probably as it should be, as it is not obvious how the 
experimenter’s skill and tacit understanding could be formally modelled.  Here again, if I 
am right, we have an essential aspect of enquiry that resists formal modelling.32  It is not 
just that the results of experiments are empirical and therefore less than wholly certain.  It 
is that navigating these uncertainties requires hands-on know-how that is nevertheless 
part of the logic of empirical enquiry. 
The ‘scientists’ of formal learning theory can usually get away with passively 
contemplating whatever data they are fed because it is normally stipulated that the 
‘environment’ drops all the facts into their laps eventually.  In the case of language-
learning, Gold’s 1967 paper assumed that every string in the target language is presented 
                                                 
31
 See e.g. Galison (1987). 
32
 This connects with an issue in artificial intelligence and philosophy of mind.  Some philosophers (under 
various influences including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Kuhn and the later Wittgenstein) deny that know-
how can be comprehensively analysed into propositional knowledge-that.  If they are correct then 
experimenters’ skills cannot be entirely coded in a logic-system.  See Dreyfus 1992. 
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to the learner at least once.33  This is a reasonable assumption if the point is to establish 
impossibility results, because a language that is unlearnable with this generous 
assumption is certainly unlearnable without it.  However, deciding what data to collect is 
a crucial part of scientific judgment, not least because it is often the case that data cannot 
be collected passively.  Much of our information about the world cannot be gathered 
without the use of specialist machines, and will not be gathered unless some scientist 
believes that it can be gathered and is worth gathering.  No-one committed to humour-
medicine would bother to go looking for germs.  No-one committed to perfect, 
unchanging Heavens would bother to set up a screen to display sun-spots.  Moreover the 
available technology sets limits to the range of possible experiments and observations.  In 
learning theory the available data is specified when the ‘environment’ is fixed, but 
(reasonably) the ‘environment’ is not changed by the ‘scientist’s’ learning.  The 
‘environment’ sends its data in a pre-determined stream regardless of the ‘scientist’s’ 
state of knowledge.  In practice, new knowledge raises new questions, which in turn elicit 
data that would not otherwise have been forthcoming. 
Now, learning theorists know that their ‘scientists’ are unnaturally passive.  
Therefore they developed the concept of an ‘oracle’ that collects data from the 
‘environment’ and feeds it to the ‘scientist’.  The oracle decides what data to collect next 
as a function of the information received so far.34  This, though, merely raises questions 
of efficiency (that is, which oracles help scientists to reach their success-points 
quickest?).  So far as I know, learning theory does not model the fact that a scientist may 
never see certain data because his false beliefs prevent him from looking for them.  The 
oracle stands between the ‘scientist’ and the ‘environment’, and determines the order in 
which the data arrives.  The oracle is not modified by what the ‘scientist’ learns (though 
in advanced versions of learning theory the ‘scientist’ may be modified by what it learns).  
Real scientists change their search-strategies as well as their hypotheses in the light of 
new information.  In learning theory, the real scientist has been split into a ‘scientist’ that 
forms beliefs and produces hypotheses, and an oracle that decides what question to ask 
next.  The point here is that changes to the ‘scientist’ ought to induce changes in the 
oracle.  This brings us back to the first point: there are no paradigm-shifts (or problem-
shifts, or changes of background metaphysics) in learning theory. 
A third methodological notion that learning theory may struggle to articulate is 
that of the ad hoc hypothesis.  In fact there are two principal senses in which a hypothesis 
may be ad hoc.  One is straightforward: a hypothesis is ad hoc if it has been cooked up 
solely to save a theory from one particular counterexample, but offers no explanation or 
insight into anything beyond that one case (“All swans are white—obviously, this pink 
one has been dyed.”).  The other sense of ad hoc requires reference to a research 
                                                 
33
 Gold 1967 p. 448.  This presentation can take two forms: ‘text’ and ‘informant’.  A ‘text’ for a language 
L is “a sequence of strings x1, x2,… from L  such that every string of L  occurs at least once in the text” 
(ibid. p. 450).  An ‘informant’ for L  “can tell the learner whether any string is an element of L, and does so 
at each time t for some string yt” (op. cit.).  In the case of learning from an informant rather than from a 
text, it is assumed that every finite string of the alphabet common to the possible languages will come up at 
least once.  No other strings are presented, and each string is accompanied by information as to whether the 
string is correct or incorrect.  He briefly considers ‘request informants’ that answer queries about strings 
chosen by the learner, but quickly proves that these are equivalent to the ‘arbitrary informant’ that rules on 
all the possible strings in an arbitrary order (ibid. p. 467). 
34
 Martin & Osherson (1998) pp. 87–90. 
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programme: a hypothesis is ad hoc in this sense if it is developed using resources from 
outside the proper repertoire of the research programme.  A hypothesis could be ad hoc in 
the second sense but not in the first.  That is, a hypothesis could be an insight and a step 
in the right direction, and yet be ad hoc with respect to a research programme that makes 
use of it (“The flow of humours through a wound may be blocked by tiny animals, so we 
should boil our instruments and bandages to kill them.”  Here, germ theory is ad hoc with 
respect to humour-medicine, but is in itself an insight.).  It may be possible to formalise 
the first sense of ad hoc.  However, general accounts of methodology, including formal 
learning theory, will struggle to articulate the second notion of ad hoc-ness because it 
requires the notion of a sustained and unified enquiry (or paradigm, or research 
programme, etc.) as a heuristic whole.  Here, the point is the same as I argued above for 
domains of enquiry.  The principle of unity of a research programme is specific to that 
programme.  If the unity of a research programme cannot be formally modelled, then it 
must also be impossible to model the case in which a given hypothesis violates that unity 
(excluding trivial models in which the unity of the programme is an unanalysed black 
box). 
The pattern of argument should be obvious now if it was not before: I have 
deliberately picked out methodological notions and truisms that require some reference to 
the specifics of the domain of enquiry or the unity of the enquiry itself.  It is, ultimately, 
the unity of these complex wholes (domains of enquiry and research programmes) that 
resists formalisation.  There is another notion that depends on them, which for the sake of 
a label we might call the ‘Whewell bonus’.  This is the case in which a theory predicts or 
explains a phenomenon that it was not originally intended to address; the case in which 
even the theory’s champions are pleasantly surprised by its success.  This notion is 
notoriously difficult to formalise because as it stands it involves the intentions of the 
theory’s originator.  These intentions (being psychological items) ought to be irrelevant if 
the Whewell bonus is an objective virtue of theories.  The challenge is to capture the 
thought that a theory has reached beyond its original scope without making any 
psychological reference.   Here again, I would argue for particularism: there is no general 
logical account of the original scope of theories.  If in any given case it is possible 
objectively to determine the original scope of a theory, it is only by paying attention to 
the details in hand.  Apart from anything else, it may be that the proper scope of a theory 
is in part a function of the history of the discipline in question prior to the formulation of 
the theory.  The same point comes up if we consider unification by consilience, in which 
a pair of distinct theories in hitherto separate domains of enquiry come to reinforce each 
other (for example, if studies of population DNA and the evolution of language groups 
produce the same hypotheses about human kinship and migration). 
The Whewell bonus raises another class of methodological notions and truisms, 
namely, those that exploit the insight that theories are as much tested against each other 
as they are against nature.  We accept our current scientific orthodoxies because they are 
our least lousy theories so far.  Therefore, we cannot fully formalise a set of criteria for 
accepting or rejecting theories without articulating some principle(s) of comparison 
between theories.  In particular, a Whewell bonus is only a real bonus if the phenomenon 
has not already been adequately explained by some other theory.  I shall not insist on this 
point, however, as it may be possible to modify formal ‘scientists’ so that they watch 
each other’s results as well as their own and modify their enquiries accordingly.  Indeed, 
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there are already some results about teams of ‘scientists’, though these do not answer the 
present point.35 
4) Conclusion 
So far I have argued that there are methodological notions and truisms that formal 
learning theory has not captured, and probably will not ever capture.  This is essentially 
the same claim that Glymour, Laudan and Salmon made about Bayesianism.  Since this is 
a negative claim, let me now allay some natural fears.  The point is not to ‘attack’ formal 
learning theory, but rather to learn a lesson from the history of our own discipline.  When 
philosophers acquire a new tool, there is a danger that the rising generation of researchers 
may be so impressed with it that much of what was known before is forgotten.  The more 
impressive the tool, the more intense the danger.  Something of the sort seems to have 
happened to the philosophy of science and mathematics with the development of formal 
logic from Frege onwards, and it took a rather wrenching ‘historical turn’ for 
philosophers to rediscover the sensitivity to history and practice that previous generations 
took for granted.  Let us not make the same mistake again.  Let us learn what we can 
from formal learning theory without losing sight of what we have learned from historical, 
sociological and phenomenological studies of science.  These studies have shown us that 
much of the rigour of science is bound up with the subject-matters and specialist 
techniques of individual sciences.  Dendrochronology, for example, depends on truths 
about logic, trees and the weather, plus the judgment of experts and the reliability of their 
computers.  To isolate the logical aspect and forget the rest makes a mystery of the 
effectiveness of the technique, and this is to invite mystification and scepticism.  It is 
precisely because the rigour of each special science depends on its characteristic objects 
and techniques that enquiry is not the sort of thing of which there can be a science. 
Philosophy ought not to ignore developments in logical theory.  But the 
alternative to mathematical accounts of enquiry is not mere ‘religion’, and philosophy 
ought not to ignore historical and phenomenological studies of scientific practice either.  
Philosophy cannot (as Salmon hoped) simply combine these approaches because their 
standards of rigour are incompatible.  Abstraction is a methodological sin among 
historians, while historicism is anathema to logicians.  Philosophers, caught in the 
middle, are at once chided by mathematical logicians for lacking the clarity of the exact 
sciences, and by historians for concocting abstractions while neglecting concrete reality.  
The point of this article is to explain to exponents of formal learning theory that, if 
philosophers do not embrace it with both hands, it may be because one hand is already 
carrying a rather unwieldy load of historical and phenomenological insight. 
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